

Assimilation and Rising Taiwanese Identity: Taiwan-born Immigrants in the United States, 1990-2000

Zhou Yu* Lan-Hung Nora Chiang**

* Assistant Professor, Department of Family and Consumer Studies and Institute of Public and International Affairs, University of Utah

** Professor, Department of Geography, National Taiwan University.

Corresponding Author: nora@ntu.edu.tw

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Abstract

This study examines why a growing percentage of Taiwan-born immigrants in the U.S. have identified themselves as Taiwanese rather than ethnic Chinese in the U.S. decennial censuses between 1990 and 2000. The trend appears inconsistent with the assimilation theory, which postulates that ethnic groups will become more detached from ethnic politics and identity the longer they stay in the United States. The application of a double cohort method enables us to separate the period effect from the duration effect, which is critical to analyzing the changes. Results show sharp temporal differentiation and large geographical variation. The older generation of Taiwanese immigrants and recent arrivals to the United States, as well as those who live in Los Angeles, are the most likely to regard themselves as Taiwanese rather than ethnic Chinese. In contrast, Taiwan-born immigrants who have greater English proficiency, who have less education, and who have [mainland] Chinese as their neighbors are less likely to do so.

Moreover, age-at-arrival is a key determinant in identity formation and change. Those who came to the U.S. when they were young are least likely to regard themselves as Taiwanese. Over time, Taiwan-born immigrants have indeed become more acculturated. Young Taiwan-born immigrants who came to the U.S. before the 1970s are least likely to make a switch to Taiwanese during the period. However, acculturation alone does not prevent one from claiming Taiwanese identity on the census form. For Taiwan-born immigrants, writing in Taiwanese on the census form appears to be a "rebellious" or "awakening" act and a symbolic expression of solidarity with their compatriots in Taiwan, empowered by a growing sense of Taiwanese consciousness. Globalization may now have allowed immigrants to maintain a closer tie with their country of origin than before, especially in times of crisis.

Keywords: *Taiwanese identity, Taiwan-born immigrants, ethnic Chinese, assimilation theory, double-cohort method*

I. Introduction

Identity has always been a very complex phenomenon, linked to factors such as the place and period of birth, the language used, and personal experiences. Identity has been used as a tool of political empowerment, resource mobilization, and boundary formation. It often evokes strong emotion and fierce political reaction, especially among Taiwan immigrants in the United States.

While the exact meaning of Taiwanese is debatable, there has been a surge in the acknowledgement of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan-born immigrants in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of people reporting "Taiwanese" as their race/ethnicity in the U.S. Census increased by more than 60 percent. While the increase is attributable to continued immigration from Taiwan, another important factor is the increase in the number of Taiwan-born immigrants¹ who embraced a new identity — a Taiwanese one — apart from the Chinese one.

The issue of Taiwanese identity is pertinent to the U.S. foreign policy², since the U.S. has an obligation to intervene in case of an attack from Mainland China (Sutter 2002). Taiwan immigrants, who are socioeconomically well-off, have been proactive in the independence movement of Taiwan (Lin 2006). Taiwanese identity is an important topic

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- 1 The term "Taiwan immigrants" should be used exclusively to mean anyone who immigrated to the U.S. from Taiwan. In this paper, we focus on "Taiwan-born immigrants" and use one's place of birth to identify the whole group. By this definition, we have left out those who were born in Mainland China, and came to Taiwan between 1945 and 1950, when the Republic of China government fled in exile to Taiwan.
 - 2 Immigrants have heavily influenced the foreign policy of the U.S., a country founded and populated by immigrants (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Ambrosio 2002). Moreover, some diaspora groups have become significant players in the politics of their homelands (Shain 1999).

not only for policymakers, but also for researchers. It would be useful to understand the extent to which assimilation affects identity formation, especially in the era of globalization.

Although scholars in both Taiwan and the United States have thoroughly studied the rising Taiwanese consciousness in Taiwan (e.g., Baum and Sherry 1999; Liu and Ho 1999; Wu 2001; Marsh 2002; Wang and Chang 2005), the identity formation of Taiwan-born immigrants in the United States is much less documented. This study focuses on Taiwan-born immigrants and examines the extent to which the socioeconomic and demographic correlations are associated with their identity formation and change. This article also attempts to test a number of competing hypotheses.

The present study uses decennial Census public use microdata (PUMS) to track both birth cohorts and immigrant arrival cohorts, treating identity change as a temporal process influenced by multiple forces. The analysis follows a cohort approach, which was found to be highly suitable in the study of social changes (Lieberson 1965; Ryder 1965; Carliner 2000; Myers 2004). More specifically, the analysis uses a double cohort method, originally proposed by Myers and Lee (1996, 1998), for studying the adaptation of immigrants over time. The major advantage of this method is to separately identify period effect from the effect of immigrant duration in the study of longitudinal trends. Moreover, this study relies on the U.S. Census data, which has been a powerful yet underused source of information about collective identity formation (Kertzer and Arel 2002).

In the following section, we will firstly provide background information, review previous studies, and look at a number of conflicting findings and hypotheses on identity formation. After a summary describing major trends, we will analyze identity choice in a multivariate framework and take into account explanatory variables at three levels: individual,

household, and residential area. We will then conclude with a discussion of the implications from our findings.

II. Background and Pertinent Literature

(1) Rapid Changes across the Taiwan Strait in the 1990s

Taiwanese identity is partly influenced by the cross-Strait relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, which is one of the most contentious and potentially explosive issues in East Asia. While economic relations have rapidly improved between the two sides, political relations has become severely strained in the 1990s (Rigger 1997; Marsh 2000). During this time, the independence movement in Taiwan gained considerable momentum. In response, the mainland government explicitly threatened to use force should Taiwan declare independence (Yu 1999). However, the threat has so far appeared to have backfired. The opposition pro-independence party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) successfully challenged the ruling Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT) and eventually took power in the 2000 presidential election, effectively ending five decades of control by the KMT (Kuo 1997; Wang 2000).

(2) Rising Taiwanese Identity in Taiwan

Identity is one of the most sensitive issues in Taiwan, straddling the fault line between the Mainlanders³ — mostly minority elites who took

3 The population of Taiwan is represented by four main groups who differ in terms of time of arrival, size and language of use. The Taiwan indigenous population (*yuanchumin*) constitutes less than 2 per cent of the population. The Hoklos and Hakka, who are often referred to as native Taiwanese (*benshengren*) form 71 per cent and less than 12 per cent respectively (Corcuff 2002; Ministry of Interior 2002; Williams 2003). The fourth group consists of the

power in the late 1940s—and the larger native — Taiwanese population who has a growing sentiment toward Taiwan independence (Meisner 1963; Wachman 1994; Phillips 2003). In the late 1990s, the then-President Li Teng-hui encouraged the Taiwanese localization movement (*bentuhua*) and promoted a new Taiwanese identity to bridge the traditional fault lines between native-Taiwanese (*benshengren*) and the minority Mainlanders (*waishengren*) (Baum and Sherry 1999; Lin and Tedards 2002; Brown 2004). In Taiwan, it is now harder to differentiate native-Taiwanese from Mainlanders because more and more of the younger generation are born from 'mixed' marriages (Corcuff 2002; Wang 2005). Meanwhile, a large number of Taiwanese people have recognized the uniqueness of the political system in Taiwan and have shown a strong desire to maintain the political status quo and their self-identity (Liu and Ho 1999; Wu 2001). A province-wide survey conducted between 1994 and 1998 shows that although "double identity" (both Taiwanese and Chinese) was prevalent at first, the "Taiwanese only" identity rose gradually and was even slightly higher than that of "double identity" in 1998 (Wang and Chang 2005; Wu 2005; Liu and Ho 1999). Regardless of ethnic background, age, educational level, gender, and partisan identity, the Taiwanese people's Chinese identity percentage decreased while their Taiwanese identity rose sharply (Liu and Ho 1999). More recently, Huang (2005) has shown that there are multiple dimensions to Taiwanese identity reflecting the interplay between self-identity and national identity. Therefore, it is not always possible to separate all dimensions of identity.

mainlanders (*waishenren*) and their descendants, who came to Taiwan from 1946 to 1950 when the mainland fell to the communists. Recently, some of the Mainlanders identify themselves as "New Taiwanese", as they have lived in Taiwan for the longest time of their lives, and have chosen Taiwan as their homeland.

Taiwan's democratization in the decade of the 1990's had a big influence on the questions of identity. Martial law was lifted in 1987, and the DPP, which was formed in 1988, struggled initially to achieve legitimacy and power. *Dangwai* (outside of KMT) political activities had started in the late 1970s, culminating with the election of Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000 (Rigger 2000). Chen subsequently helped to foster a growing sense of Taiwanese identity, which allowed his party to gain more grassroots support, even among some Mainlanders (Hung 2004; Marquand 2004; Wang and Chang 2005) .

(3) Taiwan-born Immigrants in the United States

Immigrants in the United States are not immune from the politics in their country of origin. Some have been instrumental in the independence movement in their native country (Shain 1994). In fact, the founding father of modern China, Sun Yat-sen, received substantial support from overseas Chinese in his revolutionary effort in 1911 (Sharman 1934). It is therefore not a total surprise that the percentage increase of Taiwan-born immigrants who regarded themselves as Taiwanese was 40 percentage points higher during the 1990s than the growth rate of Taiwan-born immigrants during the same period of time. One may infer that at least some of the increased expression of Taiwanese identity in the U.S. Census in 2000 reflected an "awakening" sense of pride in being "Taiwanese."

More than 30 percent of 300,000 Taiwan-born immigrants⁴ in the

4 It is quite complex to categorize and estimate Taiwan immigrants in the U.S., because of limited data. According to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (2002), there were a total of 529,000 Taiwan immigrants and their descendents in the U.S. in 2000. Among them, 344,000 were first generation Taiwan immigrants and 300,000 were born in Taiwan (here referred to as Taiwan-born immigrants). Therefore, about 44,000 Taiwan immigrants were born in Mainland China and subsequently immigrated to the U.S. from Taiwan. In other words, about 12 percent of Taiwan immigrants in the U.S. were born in mainland China.

United States took extra effort to write in Taiwanese as their race/ethnicity in 2000. Pre-census campaigns by Taiwanese American (*Taimeiren*) in big cities such as Los Angeles and New York, urging the Taiwan immigrants⁵ to write in "Taiwanese" may have helped to produce this effect (Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission 2006).

While it is not surprising to see the rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan-born immigrants, the rapid pace may be counterintuitive to some observers. First, identity has been used by minority groups in the U.S. as a tool of resource mobilization and economic empowerment (Martin 1991; Smith 1992). However, Taiwan immigrants are in general well-off and have a disproportionate representation in the political system⁶ (Chen 1992; Yu 2006).

Second, the rise of Taiwanese identity appears inconsistent with the assimilation theory which predicts that ethnic groups will become more detached from ethnic politics and identity the longer they stay in the U.S. (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003; Lien et al. 2004). If assimilation were to be taking place, Taiwanese immigrants would become less interested in the country-specific identity.

Third, ethnic identity has been used to set group boundaries and enhance group solidarity (Greeley 1974; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). However, for many years, Taiwan immigrants have peacefully coexisted with other ethnic Chinese groups, particularly those from mainland China. They have not only worked together, but also lived close to each other in the

5 Only a very small percentage of Taiwan immigrants in the U.S. considered themselves as *waishengren*. As discussed above, about 12 percent of Taiwan immigrants in the U.S. were born in Mainland China and came to Taiwan during and after China's Civil War in 1949 when the mainland fell to the communists (Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission 2002).

6 It takes extra effort to write in "Taiwanese" in the Census form. In contrast, it is much easier to choose "Chinese" as a multiple-choice option. Therefore, writing in "Taiwanese" in the census form indicates a greater affinity with the term Taiwanese.

same ethnic community. If Taiwanese identity were to be used for resource competition and confrontation, switching from Chinese to Taiwanese would have created a boundary to separate Taiwanese from the [mainland] Chinese. If this were the case, Taiwan-born immigrants would be more prone to Taiwanese identity in place of high concentration of [mainland] Chinese immigrants.

So, are there major differences between immigrants from Taiwan and those from mainland China? In addition to the similarities discussed above, almost all Taiwan-born immigrants speak Mandarin Chinese and they are able to communicate with their mainland counterparts without much difficulty. There are however some important differences between the two groups. First, [mainland] Chinese immigrants are polarized in their socioeconomic status, while Taiwan immigrants are relatively 'well-to-do' and have high levels of human capital (Chen 1992; Yu 2006). Second, the two groups have different social and historical experiences, which lead to their differing opinions about the status of Taiwan. While [mainland] Chinese immigrants seem at best ambivalent about the idea of Taiwan independence, a large number of Taiwan immigrants support some form of independence. Third, there has been an influx of new immigrants from mainland China in recent years. Many new arrivals are poor and a small number of them even came to the U.S. illegally. The title "Chinese" may have become less appealing over time. Therefore, Taiwan immigrants may have used the title "Taiwanese" to distinguish themselves from [mainland] Chinese immigrants in the United States. In contrast, the number of Taiwan immigrants who are newly arrived in the U.S. has declined over the past decade (Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission 2002). In fact, the Taiwan-born immigrant population in 2000 was less than one third of the size of the [mainland] Chinese immigrant population, most of whom came to the U.S.

after 1980⁷.

(4) Identity-Primordialist vs. Social Constructionist

Cerulo (1997) provides a detailed review of the literature on identity formation. Early researchers believed that biological differences or physical attributes separated humans into different groups, such as tribes or races (Stephan and Stephan 2000). The term "ethnicity" gained traction in the mid to late 20th century (Greeley 1974; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). Compared with race, ethnicity seems to emphasize more on social divisions than on biological or physical differences (Yinger 1985).

In the past 40 years, our understanding about ethnic identity has evolved. Early dominant theories tended to view ethnic identity as essentially "primordial affinity and attachments" and stress the permanence of ethnic and racial boundaries. Ethnicity was portrayed as inherited attributes that leave little room for individual choice (Geertz 1963; Isaacs 1975). In contrast, contemporary theoretical formulations highlight the socially constructed nature of ethnic identity (Barth 1969; Gans 1979; Waters 1990). Ethnic identity is situational, negotiated, and adaptable (Nagata 1974; Okamura 1981; Eschbach and Gomez 1998). It is unclear, however, which theory provides a better explanation for Taiwanese identity.

7 Here is a brief account of immigration from China and Taiwan to the U.S. in recent decades. The number of ethnic Chinese immigrants was minimal until 1965 when race-based quotas were terminated. From 1965 to 1978, most ethnic Chinese immigrants were from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some of them were born in mainland China and left the country during and after the civil war. Mainland China shut off emigration until 1978 when the country started economic reform. After the U.S. officially recognized mainland China's government in 1979, the number of mainland Chinese immigrants surged (Holdaway 2007). Starting from 1981, mainland China received its own quota of 20,000 per year. Meanwhile, immigration from Taiwan has gradually declined over time from its peak of 18,000 in 1992 to about 9,000 in 2007 (Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission 2002; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008).

(5) Competing Hypotheses on Taiwanese Identity

There are also conflicting findings in the identity formation process. On one side, ethnic identity is associated with a working- and lower-class style. Minority and disadvantaged groups have a greater need to create new alliances to face off discrimination and advance mutual interests (Alba 1990). Therefore, they are more likely to form distinctive identities to claim rights and privileges that have been denied to them by the majority group (Bell 1975). If this is the case, the relatively less 'well-to-do' Taiwan immigrants may be more willing to switch their identity to face off [mainland] Chinese immigrants, who outnumber Taiwan immigrants by a large margin in the U.S. Since new immigrants are more likely to concentrate in ethnic communities (White et al. 1993), less affluent [mainland] Chinese immigrants may be in direct competition for jobs with less 'well-to-do' Taiwan immigrants. Meanwhile, upward mobility promotes assimilation and erodes the strength of identity. In this case, socioeconomic status and assimilation should be negatively associated with the consciousness of identity (Gans 1982).

On the other hand, research has found that people of higher educational attainment and socioeconomic status are more prone to expressing an identity (Lieberson 1985). Immigrants of higher socioeconomic status are also the most likely to maintain ties with countries of origin and forge strong transnational linkages (Portes 1995). While identity as a common cultural bond does not necessarily advance socioeconomic status of the 'well-to-do', it provides opportunities for people who want to reconcile contradictory values and enhance common ground (Waters 1990; Barth 2000). Furthermore, people of higher socioeconomic status may simply be more

willing to declare their "symbolic identity"⁸ in surveys (Gans 1979; Farley 1991; Lieberson and Waters 1993).

There are also competing theories regarding the likelihood of young people to change their identity. On one hand, the younger generation may be more "rebellious" and more likely to challenge their given identity (Ryder 1965). In this case, young people who were given the "Chinese" identity might be more willing to switch to Taiwanese. On the other hand, young immigrants may be more "forgetful" about their primordial ties with Taiwan and become less interested in ethnic politics over time, which will lower their affinity with "Taiwanese." Assimilation manifests itself most strongly among young people (Carliner 2000). It is unclear here which case better explains the emergence of Taiwanese identity among young Taiwan-born immigrants.

The questions posed in our research are summarized as so: Are Taiwan-born immigrants switching their identity as a tool of resource mobilization or more of a symbolic gesture? Which set of socio-demographic attributes are closely linked to the identity shift? To what extent are their identity affected by assimilation and identity politics in Taiwan? Are birth cohorts and immigrant cohorts in sync with their identity change? All these questions have one common denominator — studying changes over time. Most empirical studies on identity formation so far have drawn longitudinal inferences from cross-sectional analysis. This study, however, employs a double cohort method to address this problem.

8 Gans (1979) contends that identity in some cases has emerged as a social construction in a symbolic form, which is always in flux, in the state of being re-located within the existing social structure and re-filled with new meanings and content. The "symbolic identity" is often used to enhance the feeling of a group without strengthening its social structure.

III. Data and Methods

(1) Data

The analysis will use the 5-percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS)⁹ data for the U.S. for the years between 1990 and 2000. The microdata is extracted from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) database (Ruggles et al. 2003). The PUMS data is arguably the most comprehensive public data source in the United States by which small groups such as Taiwanese immigrants can be specifically investigated. We focus on those who were born in Taiwan and have subsequently immigrated to the United States. The sample is pooled between the 1990 and 2000 census data, which was limited to those aged between 15-65 in 1990 and 25-75 in 2000.

(2) Outcome Variable

The primary outcome variable in this study is Taiwanese identity, referring to those who wrote in "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese" as their race entry on the census form. With respect to the questionnaire design, the write-in options appear to be consistent between the 1990 and 2000 censuses. In both years, people had the option to choose "Other Asian and Pacific Islanders", and print their race/ethnicity in the boxes given. People

9 According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2003), the PUMS files contain records representing 5-percent samples of the U.S. housing units and the people in the occupied units. The computer-accessible files contain records for a sample of housing units, with information on the characteristics of each housing units and the people in it. Within the limits of sample size and geography, the data gives users the flexibility of preparing necessary tabulations. The information is largely self-reported.

have to take extra effort to write in their choice. Therefore, those who wrote Taiwanese as their race in the census questionnaire should have a strong affinity with the Taiwanese identity¹⁰. (See Appendix 1 for the census questions on race and birthplace in both 1990 and 2000¹¹).

We have to keep in mind that we have limited knowledge on whether one is of Mainlander (*waishengren*) descent or a native-Taiwanese (*benshengren*) descent. Research has shown that, among Taiwan-born immigrants in the U.S., the number of native-Taiwanese who came to the United States grew from 1960 to 1990, while the number of Mainlanders significantly declined over time. About 12 percent of Taiwan immigrants were born in mainland China in 2000 (Chen 1992; Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission 2002). Our limitation of the sample to Taiwan-born immigrants helps mitigate this problem. The samples all have a primordial connection which is their birthplace — Taiwan¹².

(3) Model

Our analytical strategy consists of two major steps. First, we present descriptive statistics of important variables used in our analysis. Second, we use logistic regression to estimate a model of identity formation and change.

10 In addition to the written-in race/ethnicity, people also have the option to write in their ancestry or ethnic origin in the open-ended question of the census long form. But the answers to the ethnic origin question tend to be inconsistent and fluctuate over time (Farley 1991; Lieberman and Waters 1993).

11 For the first time in history, the 2000 Census allows for more than one race identification. We categorize those who both wrote Taiwanese and marked Chinese as Taiwanese. In our sample, about 2.6% of the observations in 2000 fall into this category.

12 There comes the question of whether ethnic Chinese immigrants have different propensities, when it comes to writing in Taiwan as their birthplace. To check this issue, we track both birth and immigrant cohorts and examined the share of all ethnic Chinese (including Taiwanese) who wrote in "Taiwan" as their birthplace. Except for new immigrants (arrived in the 1980s) who saw a moderate decline of two to four percentage points, the share is rather consistent between 1990 and 2000. In other words, people seem to have reported their birthplace in the same way over time.

We also ascertain the net overall effects of the explanatory variables.

As mentioned before, we use double cohort longitudinal models to study the rise of Taiwanese identity. The model enables longitudinal trends for immigrants, due to both cohort effect and period effect, to be distinguished from cross-sectional observations. Modeling procedures follow those described in Myers and colleagues (Myers and Lee 1996, 1998). The "double cohort" model nests birth cohorts within immigrant cohorts and traces changes from 1990 to 2000. The models estimated for this paper can be described as:

$$(O) = \text{Year} + \text{BC} + \text{MC} + (\text{Year} \times \text{BC}) + (\text{Year} \times \text{MC}) + (\text{BC} \times \text{MC}) + \mathbf{X}$$

where:

(O) = Taiwanese as race/ethnicity (yes = 1 and no = 0),

Year = census year (1990 = 0 and 2000 = 1),

BC = age, or birth cohort, coded in 1990 as 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, or 65-74, and with each cohort 10 years older in 2000 (reference group = 35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000),

MC = immigration duration or year of arrival, coded as 1980s arrivals, 1970s arrivals, and arrived before 1970 (reference group = 1980s arrivals),

(BC x MC) = joint immigrant cohort and birth cohort effect, and

\mathbf{X} = a vector of covariates (poverty status, education, English, and other).

Age: Age is an especially important dimension of identity awareness, because it is pertinent to the environment in which people grew up. Memory is integral to the formation of Taiwanese identity (Allio 2000). The way Taiwan-born immigrants identify themselves may be strongly embedded with birth cohorts.

Generational effects may be pronounced in Taiwan-born immigrants, since a common set of historical experiences coincides with generational status. Prior to 1945, Taiwan was under the colonial rule of Japan. During the subsequent 40-year rule by the KMT, education was biased toward mainland China. Native culture was suppressed (Brown 2004). Taiwanese language was largely banned in the media. The government prevented the use of "Taiwanese" to describe the people of Taiwan (Baum and Sherry 1999). In private, however, many older Taiwanese have deliberately maintained their separate identity (Meisner 1963). Once migrating to the U.S., they have much more freedom to express themselves. In any case, age should be a key factor in the formation of Taiwanese identity. It is expected that both young and old Taiwan-born immigrants are more likely to choose Taiwanese as their label.

The age range of this study is 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000. Five birth cohorts are constructed across time, namely those who were aged 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64 in 1990. Most Taiwan-born immigrants in the sample arrived in the U.S. before the termination of martial law in 1987. The political transformation in Taiwan has an indirect impact on their identity.

Duration of U.S. residence: The central variable for measuring the assimilation effect on immigrants has been the length of time in the host country since immigration. Over time, immigrants should become more acculturated and less involved in ethnic politics. Therefore, earlier arrivals should be less prone to expressing their Taiwanese identity.

Duration of U.S. residence is also connected with the year of arrival to the U.S. and the time when Taiwan-born immigrants left Taiwan. Each immigrant cohort has idiosyncratic historical experiences, such as Taiwanese nationalism and cross-Strait tension. Successive cohorts are

differentiated by their distinctive experiences with respect to immigration policy and socioeconomic conditions when they migrated from Taiwan to the U.S. In addition, recently arrived Taiwanese immigrants are more likely to be influenced by rising nationalism in Taiwan than those who had arrived earlier. Under the Duration of U.S. residence, three arrival cohorts are studied across time, namely those who arrived to stay in the U.S. before 1970, 1970-1979, and 1980-1989¹³. However, the process of assimilation is rarely completed in the first generation of immigrants.

English proficiency and use at home: English proficiency is a key indicator of acculturation and directly linked to assimilation (e.g., Ryder 1955; Alba and Logan 1992). Immigrant assimilation is aided by English proficiency, which enhances an immigrant's capability to live outside ethnic communities. Higher English proficiency leads to a greater involvement with the host society and a greater social distance from their compatriots. Moreover, English used at home is a clear indication of acculturation and should further increase the distance from ethnic politics and additionally reduce the consciousness of Taiwanese identity.

Human capital and economic status: Educational attainment is the principal measure of human capital. In addition, we include poverty status as an independent variable. Poverty status is a better measure of economic status than income. While Taiwanese immigrants on the whole have a considerably higher personal income than [mainland] Chinese immigrants, their household incomes are at a similar level. This is due to the fact that the female labor force participation rate of Taiwan-born immigrants is

13 Although this variable has drawn some criticism for its measurement accuracy (Ellis and Wright 1998; Massey and Redstone 2003), we believe it continues to provide useful measurements. Because of the great distance between the United States and Taiwan, Taiwan immigrants are less susceptible to the problem of circular migration than Mexican immigrants. In addition, the rates of cohort attrition are reasonably low among Taiwan-born immigrants.

substantially lower than that of [mainland] Chinese immigrants (Yu 2006). To mitigate the discrepancy, we use poverty status as a proxy for economic status. In the Census, poverty is measured at the household level and assigned to each individual member of the household. Fisher (1992) provides an excellent review of how poverty is measured in the U.S. Census.

It is important to control for human capital and economic status. In contrast to earlier Taiwanese immigrants who are mostly "human capital" immigrants, recent Taiwanese immigrants are more likely to be "capital-linked" investor immigrants (Tseng 2000). These changes might correlate with the rise of Taiwanese identity.

We code the poverty rate as a categorical variable based on the relative level of the poverty threshold. Those who live below the poverty line are coded as pov1 or "Poor"; between the poverty line and four times the poverty line as pov2 or "Median Low"; between four and five times the poverty line as pov3 or "Median High"; and five times the poverty line or higher as pov4 or "High Status."

Residential location: Geographic location is also an important factor in the formation of identity and is relevant for access to ethnic community (Xie and Goyette 1997; Qian 2004). Immigrants who have dispersed from ethnic enclaves and moved away from gateways should be less involved in ethnic politics. In contrast, residential concentration helps to maintain ethnic salience and hinders assimilation (Duncan and Lieberman 1959; Lieberman 1963). Therefore, the context in which immigrants adapt themselves is consequential to the outcomes of such adaptation (Portes and Zhou 1993).

We use two variables to measure the ethnic composition of the areas in which Taiwan-born immigrants live. They are percent Taiwan-born immigrants and percent [mainland] Chinese population, in relation to the

total population within each public use micro area (PUMA)¹⁴. We expect that the concentration of Taiwan-born immigrants will reinforce Taiwanese identity. If a Taiwanese identity is to create a boundary to separate from [mainland] Chinese immigrants, then living in areas of [mainland] Chinese should also enhance Taiwanese identity.

In addition, we control metropolitan-fixed effects in metropolitan areas where there are large Taiwan immigrant populations. More specifically, we identify Taiwan immigrants by their residential locations, which are Los Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), New York CMSA, Washington DC CMSA, San Francisco CMSA, and places outside the four metropolitan areas. Sixty-three percent of the sample observations live in these four metropolitan areas. Residents in these four metropolitan areas have better access to ethnic media and culture. Therefore, Taiwan-born immigrants in the four metropolitan areas should have a stronger propensity to identify themselves as Taiwanese than those who live outside the areas. As noted in the work of Tseng (1995), recent Taiwan-born immigrants prefer Los Angeles as their migration destination over San Francisco by a large margin. This migration trend might affect the result.

IV. Findings from the Census

While Taiwan-born immigrants have increased significantly from 1990 to 2000, the growth of [mainland] Chinese immigrants was even bigger (See Table 1). Los Angeles is the largest destination for Taiwan-born immigrants. Yet more than one in four Taiwan-born immigrants in the U.S.

14 PUMA is the smallest geographic unit observable in the PUMS file. A PUMA is a large residential district with at least 100,000 residents, and this has been shown to be highly usable despite its coarse spatial scale (Allen and Turner 1996).

reside in the Los Angeles region, while in contrast, only one in eight [mainland] Chinese immigrants in the U.S. lives in Los Angeles. The significant concentration of Taiwan-born immigrants may have an effect on their identity preferences.

Table 1. Immigrants from Taiwan and Mainland China, 1990-2000

Place of birth	1990			2000		
	The U.S.	Los Angeles*	Percent Living in LA	The U.S.	Los Angeles	Percent Living in LA
Taiwan	246,011	66,242	26.9	299,024	83,127	27.8
Mainland China (PRC)	519,419	77,628	14.9	961,115	118,070	12.3

Note: *Los Angeles here refers to Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County, CA Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Source: U.S. Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000

Table 2 focuses on the cohort of interest and shows the relative size of Taiwan-born immigrants in the U.S. About 20 percent of the ethnic Chinese immigrants in the cohort were born in Taiwan. The proportion is largely consistent between 1990 and 2000.

Table 2. Group Distributions*, 1990 and 2000

	1990	2000
The Number of Ethnic Chinese Immigrants**	44,455	42,033
Proportion who were born in Taiwan	0.228	0.200
The Number of Taiwan-born Immigrants***	10,143	8,386
Proportion who wrote in Taiwanese as their race	0.231	0.298

Note:

* Sample is limited to ethnic Chinese immigrants who were 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000, and arrived in the United States before 1990.

** Ethnic Chinese refer to those who are ethnic Chinese and were born outside the U.S. The category includes immigrants from Taiwan.

*** Taiwan-born immigrants refer to immigrants who were born in Taiwan.

Source: U.S. Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000

The fourth row of Table 2 indicates that the proportion of Taiwan-born immigrants in our sample who wrote "Taiwanese" as their race increased by six percentage points to almost 30 percent of the total in 2000 and reflected the increased levels of affinity with the Taiwanese identity. This result also shows that Taiwanese identity is quite fluid and changeable over time.

Table 3 compares how Taiwan-born immigrants differ from ethnic Chinese immigrants who were born outside Taiwan¹⁵. The table only reports the cohort of interest. Taiwan-born immigrants have a higher level of education. They also speak English better and have a lower level of poverty than other ethnic Chinese immigrants in the U.S. From 1990 to 2000, both groups experienced a slight increase in their education level, socioeconomic status, and English proficiency.

Table 3. Selected Statuses of Ethnic Chinese Immigrants by Place of Birth, 1990 and 2000

	Taiwan				Outside Taiwan			
	1990		2000		1990		2000	
	Means	Std. Error	Means	Std. Error	Means	Std. Error	Means	Std. Error
Educational attainment								
Low: High School Dropout (Educ1)	0.120	0.325	0.056	0.230	0.320	0.466	0.285	0.451
Median: High School Diploma and Some College (Educ2)	0.336	0.472	0.253	0.435	0.368	0.482	0.316	0.465
High: 4-year College Degree (Educ3)	0.543	0.498	0.691	0.462	0.312	0.463	0.399	0.490
English proficiency								
English Only (Engonly)	0.037	0.188	0.061	0.240	0.054	0.226	0.075	0.264
Well (Engwell)	0.798	0.402	0.800	0.400	0.628	0.483	0.609	0.488
Not Well (Engnotwell)	0.166	0.372	0.139	0.346	0.318	0.466	0.316	0.465
Poverty level								
High Status: over 5 times poverty line (pov4)	0.317	0.465	0.561	0.496	0.242	0.428	0.391	0.488
Median High: 4 to 5 times poverty line (pov3)	0.237	0.425	0.220	0.414	0.230	0.421	0.236	0.425
Median Low: 1 to 4 times poverty line (pov2)	0.256	0.436	0.161	0.367	0.364	0.481	0.280	0.449
Poor: below poverty line (pov1)	0.191	0.393	0.059	0.236	0.164	0.371	0.093	0.290
No. of observations	10,143		8,386		34,312		33,647	

Note: Sample is limited to ethnic Chinese immigrants who were 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000, and arrived in the United States before 1990.

Source: U.S. Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000

15 Other ethnic Chinese immigrants include Chinese who were born in places such as mainland China, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia.

Table 4 presents the percentage of Taiwan-born immigrants who wrote in "Taiwanese" as their race between 1990 and 2000. There are large increases in Taiwanese identity across the board. However, significant differences exist between birth cohorts, which may reflect generational differences in Taiwanese identity. Those who came at the ages of 25-34 (BC2) in 1990 had the lowest likelihood to write in "Taiwanese" as their race, while those who came at the ages of 45-54 (BC4) in 1990 were most likely. The level of increase is also uneven. BC4 saw the largest increase, despite their initial high level. Meanwhile BC1 (ages 16-24) had the smallest increase.

There are also large variations between arrival cohorts. Early arrivals initially had the strongest preference for being considered Taiwanese, but they had the smallest increase over time. This seems to show that, while early arrivals have a stronger affinity for their Taiwanese identity, their preference is relatively stable over time. Also consistent with our hypothesis is that the rise of Taiwanese identity is negatively correlated with English proficiency. Those who speak only English had not only the lowest likelihood of considering themselves Taiwanese, but also the smallest increase.

The result of economic status is mixed. People in the median low category are least likely to switch, while they also had the highest likelihood of writing in "Taiwanese" in 1990.

There are major differences across metropolitan areas. Taiwan immigrants are more likely to claim Taiwanese for their identity if they live in Los Angeles. The likelihood is the lowest in San Francisco. In fact, the percentage declined in San Francisco and New York in the 1990s. Metropolitan areas are certainly not the same with respect to the identity formation of Taiwan-born immigrants.

Table 4. Percentages of Taiwan-born Immigrants Who Identified as Taiwanese

	1990	2000	Change in Percent Share
Birth Cohort			
15-24 in 1990, 25-34 in 2000 (BC1)	25.6 (1,864)	27.5 (1,418)	1.9
25-34 in 1990, 35-44 in 2000 (BC2)	15.2 (3,476)	22.9 (2,822)	7.7
35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000 (BC3)	20.8 (3,212)	28.7 (2,905)	7.9
45-54 in 1990, 55-64 in 2000 (BC4)	43.2 (1,183)	51.8 (966)	8.6
55-64 in 1990, 65-74 in 2000 (BC5)	39.7 (408)	46.9 (275)	7.2
Immigrant Cohort			
1980s (MC1)	22.9 (6,383)	30.9 (4,810)	8.1
1970s (MC2)	20.7 (3,029)	25.3 (2,803)	4.6
Before 1970 (MC3)	35.6 (731)	38.9 (773)	3.4
Educational Attainment			
High: 4-year College Degree	22.1 (5,512)	29.7 (5,792)	7.6
Median: High School Diploma and Some College	23.6 (3,412)	29.7 (2,123)	6.1
Low: High School Dropout	26.6 (1,219)	31.6 (471)	5.1
English Proficiency			
English Only	16.7 (371)	20.4 (514)	3.7
Well	22.5 (8,090)	29.3 (6,708)	6.8
Not Well	27.6 (1,682)	36.7 (1,164)	9.1
Economic Status			
High Status: over 5 times poverty line (pov4)	22.0 (3,211)	29.9 (4,701)	8.0
Median High: 4 to 5 times poverty line (pov3)	26.0 (2,402)	28.2 (1,841)	2.2
Median Low: 1 to 4 times poverty line (pov2)	24.9 (2,595)	31.3 (1,347)	6.3
Poor: below poverty line (pov1)	22.1 (1,935)	30.8 (497)	8.7
Metropolitan Areas			
Los Angeles CMSA	27.7 (2,829)	41.4 (2,449)	13.7
San Francisco CMSA	18.8 (1,317)	16.5 (1,415)	-2.3
Washington DC CMSA	21.1 (432)	27.2 (345)	6.2
New York CMSA	23.7 (1,557)	23.2 (1,238)	-0.5
Outside the four metropolitan areas	21.4 (4,008)	29.6 (2,939)	8.3
No. of observations	10,143	8,386	

Note: Sample is limited to Taiwan-born immigrants who were 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000, and arrived in the United States before 1990. Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.

Source: Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000

In this section, we have used descriptive analysis to explain possible reasons for the rise of Taiwanese identity. The bivariate results are relatively easy to interpret and understand. However, they may be misleading because of possible correlations between factors. In order to disentangle the independent effects of all relevant factors, we conduct a multivariate analysis in the following section.

V. Results of Multivariate Analysis

Table 5 reports estimated coefficients, statistical significance, and odds ratio for each of the four logit models. The dependent variable is whether a Taiwan-born immigrant wrote Taiwanese as their race (yes=1) in the two censuses. Models 1 and 2 include temporal variables only, while models 3 and 4 add variables to control for human capital, economic status, English proficiency, and residential location.

Model 1 has no covariates. Overall, the results suggest that Taiwanese identity is highly stratified by cohorts, which is largely consistent with the bivariate analysis. In addition, there is a significant effect associated with the census year, indicating that a large proportion of Taiwan-born immigrants switched from "Chinese" to "Taiwanese" over time. The main effect of birth and immigrant cohorts applies to the reference cohort, which is "ages 25-34 in 1990 that arrived in the 1980s."

In model 2 of Table 5, we added age effect, duration effect, and joint immigrant cohort and birth cohort effects. A chi-square test (i.e. difference in model χ^2 statistic) shows that the interactive model clearly improves over the baseline model, indicating that selected birth cohorts in specific immigrant cohorts have unique histories of identifying with Taiwanese or "age-at-immigration" effect. It also shows that birth and immigrant cohorts

Table 5. Logistic Coefficients of Taiwanese Identity among Taiwan-born Immigrants

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff.	Odds Ratio	Coeff.	Odds Ratio	Coeff.	Odds Ratio	Coeff.	Odds Ratio
Constant	-1.593***		-1.635***		-1.667***		-1.687***	
Year (1990 = 0; 2000 = 1)	0.384***	1.468	0.552***	1.736	0.546***	1.726	0.499***	1.648
Birth cohort (BC)								
15-24 in 1990, 25-34 in 2000 (BC1)	0.503***	1.653	0.709***	2.031	0.856***	2.353	0.798***	2.220
35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000 (BC3)	0.463***	1.588	0.404***	1.499	0.399***	1.491	0.367***	1.443
45-54 in 1990, 55-64 in 2000 (BC4)	1.461***	4.311	1.344***	3.834	1.348***	3.849	1.261***	3.528
55-64 in 1990, 65-74 in 2000 (BC5)	1.276***	3.584	1.060***	2.887	1.090***	2.975	1.038***	2.825
Immigrant cohort (MC)								
1970s (MC2)	-0.380***	0.684	-0.550***	0.577	-0.530***	0.589	-0.556***	0.573
Before 1970 (MC3)	-0.135*	0.873	-0.358	0.699	-0.237	0.789	-0.212	0.809
Age effect with time (Y x BC)								
15-24 in 1990, 25-34 in 2000 (BC1)			-0.389	0.678	-0.514***	0.598	-0.490***	0.613
35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000 (BC3)			-0.030	0.970	-0.021	0.979	-0.020	0.980
45-54 in 1990, 55-64 in 2000 (BC4)			-0.103	0.902	-0.096	0.908	-0.049	0.952
55-64 in 1990, 65-74 in 2000 (BC5)			-0.212	0.809	-0.211	0.810	-0.163	0.850
Duration effect with time (Y x MC)								
1970s (MC2)			-0.153	0.858	-0.145	0.865	-0.125	0.882
Before 1970 (MC3)			-0.172	0.842	-0.156	0.856	-0.114	0.892
Joint immigrant cohort and birth cohort effect (MC x BC)								
1970s immigrant cohort								
BC1			-0.014	0.986	-0.010	0.990	0.067	1.069
BC3			0.363**	1.438	0.356**	1.428	0.403**	1.497
BC4			0.379*	1.461	0.381*	1.464	0.489**	1.631
BC5			0.756***	2.129	0.729**	2.072	0.785***	2.192
1960s or earlier immigrant cohort								
BC3			-0.266	0.767	-0.325	0.722	-0.328	0.720
BC4			0.572**	1.772	0.475*	1.607	0.539*	1.714
BC5			0.803**	2.232	0.669*	1.952	0.695*	2.003
Educational attainment								
High School Dropout (Educ1)					-0.107	0.898	-0.073	0.930
4-year College Degree (Educ3)					0.155***	1.167	0.173***	1.188
English proficiency								
Speak English only					-0.417***	0.659	-0.382***	0.682
Speak English well					-0.118*	0.889	-0.118*	0.888
Economic Status								
Median High: 4 to 5 times poverty line (pov3)					0.122	1.129	0.084	1.087
Median Low: 1 to 4 times poverty line (pov2)					0.124**	1.132	0.103*	1.108
Poor: below poverty line (pov1)					-0.124*	0.883	-0.131*	0.877
Local concentration (percent of total PUMA population)								
Mainland Chinese immigrants							-0.084***	0.919
Taiwan-born immigrants							0.246***	1.279
Metropolitan areas								
Los Angeles CMSA							0.290***	1.336
San Francisco CMSA							-0.321***	0.725
Washington DC CMSA							-0.025	0.976
New York CMSA							0.008	1.008
df		7		20		27		33
LR chi2		928		1002		1054		1443
Log likelihood		-10,184		-10,147		-10,121		-9,926
Pseudo R2		0.044		0.047		0.050		0.068
No. of observations								18,529

Note: The reference group for birth cohort in 1990 is "25-34 in 1990 and 35-44 in 2000"; for duration effect, it is immigrants arrived in the 1980s; for age effect, it is "25-34 in 1990"; for age-at-arrival effect, the reference group is "ages 25-34"; for immigrant cohort in 1990 the reference group is Taiwan-born immigrants came to the United States in the 1980s; for educational attainment, it is "High school dip. w/ college"; for English proficiency, it is "speaks English not well or not at all"; for poverty, it is "high economic status"; for metropolitan areas, it is outside the four metropolitan areas.

Source: Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

have progressed differently over time. However, the presence of the interaction terms ($Y \times BC$, $Y \times MC$, and $BC \times MC$) has little impact on the coefficient estimates of birth and immigrant cohorts.

The interpretation of age effect ($Y \times BC$) and duration effect ($Y \times MC$) has to be related to the reference group. Although all birth and immigrant cohorts have negative signs indicating they have smaller increases than the reference group, only the age effect of BC1 is statistically significant. In other words, the youngest birth cohort has the smallest increase in their likelihood. In comparison with other cohorts, young immigrants appear relatively more "forgetful" than "rebellious" in their identity shift.

Adding the interaction term ($BC \times MC$) reveals that the age-at-immigration effect is strongest in older cohorts who arrived here early. In other words, the two older birth cohorts (BC4 and BC5) in both the 1970s (MC2) and the pre-1970s (MC3) immigrant cohorts are much more likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese as indicated by the additive joint effects of birth cohort and immigrant cohort. The strong age-at-immigration effect may reflect that many old Taiwan-born immigrants were political dissidents and came to the U.S. to seek political freedom.

To address the question of how much the differences in Taiwanese identity are associated with human capital and socioeconomic correlates, we added a set of covariates in model 3. The variables of educational attainment and English proficiency are collected at the individual level, while poverty status reflects the economic condition of the household in which the individual lives. Again, a chi-square test reveals that adding the covariates presents a better goodness of fit over model 1, indicating that the likelihood of Taiwanese identification varies between socioeconomic groups and across metropolitan areas. The inclusion of the covariates, however, has little impact on the coefficient estimates of the temporal

variables presented in model 2.

Human capital and socioeconomic factors are significantly correlated with identity. Compared with the reference group¹⁶, Taiwan-born immigrants who have a 4- year college degree are most likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese. In contrast, speaking English only and living below the poverty line lowers the probability. The results show that human capital in general has a positive effect. Rather than advancing Taiwan-born immigrants' socioeconomic interest in the U.S., the acknowledgement of Taiwanese identity appears to be a symbolic move rather than for the purpose of resource mobilization. Evidently, less resourceful Taiwan-born immigrants are no more likely to consider themselves as Taiwanese than well-off Taiwanese. Furthermore, assimilation diminishes the propensity for doing so.

Model 4 adds location variables. The coefficient estimates of temporal variables do not change significantly from those of previous models. Results show that a higher concentration of Taiwan-born immigrants is positively related to the probabilities of Taiwanese identity. In other words, living in Taiwan-born immigrant communities reinforces Taiwanese identity, possibly due to better access to ethnic politics and media. This finding supports the assimilation perspective in that ethnic concentration slows down assimilation and leads to a stronger ethnic identity.

Surprisingly, Taiwan-born immigrants who live in areas of higher concentration of [mainland] Chinese immigrants are less likely to claim Taiwanese identity. In those areas, Taiwan-born immigrants may have more opportunities to communicate with [mainland] Chinese immigrants. This finding seems to show that they do not use their Taiwanese identity to set up a boundary and separate themselves from [mainland] Chinese immigrants. Despite their socioeconomic and political differences, there is not a lot of

animosity between Taiwanese immigrants and [mainland] Chinese immigrants. At the same time, living with other Taiwan-born immigrants enhances Taiwanese identity. This finding is consistent with the assimilation theory. However, large geographical variation remains after controlling for other relevant factors. Taiwan-born immigrants in Los Angeles, which is the largest U.S. destination for Taiwan-born immigrants, are much more likely to claim their Taiwanese identity. Taiwan immigrant organizations in Los Angeles have appeared particularly successful in resource mobilization (Tempest 2004; Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission 2006).

The pattern of effects is sufficiently complex that we evaluate them graphically. Figure 1 depicts the predicted probability of Taiwanese identification by Taiwan-born immigrants' birth and immigrant cohort, while holding other variables at their sample means. The predicted probability is first calculated for each observation based on the coefficient estimates of model 4, averaged, and then visually presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows there are large temporal variations. The tendency of older cohorts (BC4 and BC5) to declare their Taiwanese identity in the census form is significantly higher than that of younger cohorts (BC1, BC2, and BC3). New arrival cohorts have a stronger propensity than earlier arrival cohorts.

There is an overwhelming period effect (year), which overpowers other forces. Noticeably, all birth cohorts have shown significant

16 The reference group for immigrant cohort in 1990 is Taiwan-born immigrants who came to the United States during the 1980s; for educational attainment it is "High school diploma with some college education"; for English proficiency it is "speaks English not well or not at all"; for poverty, it is "low" or those who are below the poverty threshold; for metropolitan areas, it is outside the four metropolitan areas." We choose this demographic group as the reference group because of their large sample size. The large size is useful for the regression model to converge. But the choice of reference group should have no impact on the result.




Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Taiwanese Identification among Taiwan-born Immigrants, 1990-2000

consistency in their increases in the propensity from 1990 to 2000. The concerted increase reflects the widespread impacts of heightened cross-strait tension, the identity politics in Taiwan, and other factors. Interestingly, even Taiwan-born immigrants who came to the U.S. for more than two decades still experienced a large increase in their propensity. The pervasiveness of identity change seems to reflect the power of

globalization, which reduces the distance between host and origin countries.

While all birth cohorts increased the propensity, there are large inter-cohort differences. The variation is largest across birth cohorts. Young cohorts seem to start from a relatively low level and increase more slowly. In addition, there is a joint effect between birth and immigrant cohorts.

Assimilation is present here: Young cohorts (BC2 and BC3 who arrived prior to 1970; BC1 and BC2 who arrived in the 1970s; and BC1 who arrived in the 1980s) have a smaller increase than other birth cohorts. These groups are likely to be educated in the U.S. and are less involved in ethnic politics. In addition, newly arrived immigrants are more likely to identify themselves as "Taiwanese". They also have a larger increase in their Taiwanese identity during the 1990s. As a result, the gap between birth cohorts is largest among early arrivals. There is also a strong joint effect between immigrant cohort and birth cohort. Older cohorts who came in the 1970s or earlier have the strongest affinity with their Taiwanese identity.

VI. Conclusions

This paper has investigated the rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan-born immigrants in the United States. Application of the double cohort method enables us to reveal how identity switching occurs within a complex temporal structure. The extent to which Taiwan-born immigrants change their identification is not only affected by the political events in Taiwan, but is also embedded with their year of birth, year of arrival, and age at arrival. The identity formation is subject to the interplay of multiple forces. The study also demonstrates the usefulness of census data in the analysis of identity formation.

This study is couched in extensive literature. To a great extent, the

findings are consistent with the existing literature on ethnic identification. That is, the identity of Taiwan-born immigrants is fluid and changeable. There has been a surge in Taiwanese identity even among Taiwan immigrants who have been in the U.S. for more than two or three decades. Primordial ties play a critical role in the identity formation of Taiwan-born immigrants, evidenced by the overwhelming period effect—a concerted increase in Taiwanese identity among all birth and immigrant cohorts. The shared birthplace seems to have synchronized all Taiwan-born immigrants in the identity shift. In addition, there is a strong evidence of cohort continuity in identity change, as all cohorts have progressed in a similar direction.

Assimilation plays an important role in the identity formation of Taiwan-born immigrants. First, for those who are acculturated or speak only English at home, they are less likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese. Second, cohort analysis discloses significant variations in the trajectories of Taiwanese identity, showing a rapid rise among older cohorts and recent arrivals while indicating a relatively small increase among young people and more settled immigrants. Third, age-at-arrival is a strong determinant. Evidently the BC2 and BC3 cohorts who came to the U.S. before the 1970s were least likely to claim Taiwanese identity and make changes over time. Fourth, Taiwan-born immigrants have a lower propensity when they live outside Taiwan-born immigrant communities and outside Los Angeles—the largest Taiwanese migration destination in the U.S. These findings seem to show that assimilation has started to blur the boundary between Taiwanese and [mainland] Chinese immigrants.

This research also contributes to the ethnicity literature. The existing literature on ethnic identity has primarily focused on the extent to which minority groups accept or reject given identities. The story is largely

oriented around the conflicts between the white majority and selected minority groups. In contrast, there has been little apparent tension between Taiwan immigrants and the white majority or between Taiwan immigrants and [mainland] China immigrants. Avenarius' study of Taiwan sub-ethnic immigrant groups in Orange County shows that growing up in Taiwan may not be a sufficient factor to bring immigrants with different sub-ethnic affiliations together in their new place of settlement, as she wrote: "[The] Taiwanese socialize mainly with fellow native Taiwanese; Mainlanders spend their free time primarily with other Mainlanders" (Avenarius 2007).

Divisions seem more apparent in the Taiwanese diaspora communities, particularly between the older generation of Mainlanders and native Taiwanese.

For Taiwan-born immigrants, being Taiwanese appears to be a "rebellious" or an "awakening" identity and a symbolic expression of public solidarity with their compatriots back home, influenced by growing Taiwanese nationalism and energized by heightened cross-Strait tension. Even though political conflicts occur in places far away, globalization has shortened the distance between origin and host countries and enhanced the Taiwanese identity of Taiwan-born immigrants. Highly educated Taiwan immigrants have higher propensities to identify themselves as Taiwanese, which seems to confirm the facilitating effects of globalization. To the extent that ethnic politics may become a less potent force among immigrant children and second generation immigrants, further study is necessary.

Taiwanese identity appears more symbolic than substantive, because the strength of Taiwanese identity is negatively related to educational attainment and economic status. In addition, living with their mainland counterparts lowers the propensity, even though many less affluent Taiwan immigrants are in direct competition with [mainland] Chinese immigrants

for jobs. Taiwanese identity does not appear to be used for resource competitions with [mainland] Chinese immigrants. Nor is it used for further advancing Taiwan immigrants' economic interests. Unlike other minority groups documented in the literature, Taiwan immigrants have not been a target of socioeconomic oppression in the United States.

It is, however, puzzling to observe the large geographical variations between metropolitan areas in the U.S. Not only is the identification highest in Los Angeles and lowest in San Francisco, but the rate of identity shift is also largest in Los Angeles and smallest in San Francisco. Both metropolitan areas have large ethnic Chinese communities, although the relative size of Taiwan-born immigrants is significantly smaller in San Francisco. While regional differences in political mobilization and migration trends may have played a role, further research is clearly needed to better understand the large geographical variations.

In the absence of cross-strait antagonism, it is unclear whether the trend of rising Taiwanese identity will continue in the future. While Taiwanese identity will remain fluid and changeable, we may observe more mixed marriages between sub-ethnic Taiwanese groups and between Taiwanese and [mainland] Chinese immigrants. As a result of inter-group marriages and further assimilation to the U.S., Taiwan immigrants have the possibility to less emphasise on a country-specific identity and create more inclusive identities. The upcoming 2010 U.S. Census may reveal more interesting patterns, especially given that the KMT returned to power in 2008 and that cross-strait relations have become less confrontational since the last U.S. Census in 2000. A follow up study is necessary to find out if Taiwan-born immigrants have a greater or smaller sense of Taiwanese identity as a result of these changes. A qualitative study will also be helpful in further deciphering the forces behind the identity formation of Taiwan

immigrants in the U.S.

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Appendix 1. Census questions on race and birthplace

1990

Race	<p>4. Race Fill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be.</p> <p>If Indian (Amer.) print the name of the enrolled or principal tribe. _____</p> <p>If Other Asian or Pacific Islander (API) print one group, for example: Hmong, Fijian, Laotian, Thai, Tongan, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so on. _____</p> <p>If Other race, Print race. _____</p>	<p><input type="radio"/> White</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Black or Negro</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Indian (Amer.) (Print the name of the enrolled or principal tribe.) ↘</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Eskimo</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Aleut</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Asian or Pacific Islander (API).</u></p> <p><input type="radio"/> Chinese <input type="radio"/> Japanese</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Filipino <input type="radio"/> Asian Indian</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Hawaiian <input type="radio"/> Samoan</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Korean <input type="radio"/> Guamanian</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Vietnamese <input type="radio"/> Other API ↘</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Other race (Print race) ↗</p>
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Birthplace	<p>8. In what U.S. State or foreign country was this person born? ↘</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____</p> <p>(Name of States or foreign country; or Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.)</p>
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2000

6 What is this person's race? Mark one or more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.

White

Black, African Am., or Negro

American indian or Alaska Native — Print name of enrolled or principal tribe. ↘

Asian Indian Native Hawaiian

Chinese Guamanian or Chamorro

Filipino Samoan

Japanese Other Pacific Islander — Print race. ↘

Korean

Vietnamese

Other Asian — Print race. ↘

Some other race — Print race. ↘

12 Where was this person born?

In the United States — Print name of state.

Outside the United States — Print name of foreign country, or Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.

同化與台灣認同的提升：1990 年至 2000 年間美國台灣出生的移民之研究

宇宙* 姜蘭虹**

中文摘要

本文探討 1990 年至 2000 年間美國的人口普查中，為何有越來越高比率移居美國的台灣出生移民認為自己是台灣人而不是華裔（ethnic Chinese）。此一趨勢似乎不合同化理論（assimilation theory），其主張當族裔群體在美國的時間越長，會使其更加脫離原本的族群政治和身份認同。本研究所採用的雙世代法（double cohort method）使我們能夠將時代效應（period effect）從期間效應（duration effect）中分開出來討論，而時代效應在分析變化上較具有鑑別性。本研究結果發現其中有很明顯的時間差異和地區變異。臺灣出生移民之中，老一輩的、初到美國的、以及住在洛杉磯地區的移民，較傾向於認為自己是台灣人而非華裔。相反地，台灣出生移民之中，具有較佳之英語能力、較低教育程度，以及與來自中國大陸的華裔人士比鄰而居者，則較不傾向於此身份認同。

此外，移入時的年紀是身份認同之形塑與轉變的重要關鍵，在年輕時就移入美國的移民，認同自我身份為台灣人的傾向最低。隨著時間的推移，台灣出生移民的涵化程度確實加深了。在 1970 年代以前抵達美國的年輕移民，最不可能在 1990 年至 2000 年間普查填表時從華裔轉換成台灣人。然而，涵化作用並不會阻止移民在填寫的普查表格上展現其對台灣身份的認同。對於這些台灣出生的移民來說，在普查表格上表示其台灣認同，似乎是一種「反叛」或「覺醒」的行動，象徵著自己對台灣同胞的支持，而此種行動深受台灣人意識抬頭的影響。

* 猶他大學家庭與消費研究學系暨公共與國際事務研究所助理教授

** 國立臺灣大學地理與環境資源學系教授。通訊作者：nora@ntu.edu.tw

響。全球化可能會使移民和其原居地保持前所未有的密切連繫，特別是在危機時期。

關鍵詞：台灣認同、台灣出生的移民、華裔、同化理論、雙世代法